1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS * SIMILARLY SITUATED *
5	Plaintiffs * CIVIL ACTION vs. * No. 19-12235-LTS
6	* QUOTEWIZARD.COM, LLC *
7	Defendant * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
8	
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE M. PAGE KELLEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L O	HEARING ON MOTIONS January 11, 2021
L1	Canadary 11, 2021
.2	<u>APPEARANCES</u> :
L3 L4	LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. MCCUE, (By Matthew P. McCue, Esq.) One South Avenue, Third Floor, Natick, Massachusetts, 01760, on behalf of Plaintiffs
L5 L6	THE LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD A. BRODERICK, (By Edward A. Broderick, Esq.) 208 Ridge Street, Winchester, Massachusetts 01890, on behalf of Plaintiffs
L7	NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, (By Kevin
8.	P. Polansky, Esq.), One Post Office Square, 30th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts, 02109, on behalf of Defendant
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PROCEEDINGS

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(VIA ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE)

THE CLERK: Today is Monday, January 11, 2021, and we are on the record in the Civil Case No. 19-12235, Joseph Mantha versus QuoteWizard.com, LLC, the Honorable M. Page Kelley presiding.

Would counsel please identify themselves for the record.

MR. McCUE: Matthew McCue for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. McCue.

MR. BRODERICK: Good afternoon, your Honor. Edward Broderick, also for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you, Mr. Broderick.

MR. POLANSKY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Kevin Polansky on behalf of the defendant, QuoteWizard.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Polansky. So you're outnumbered here, so there's no other -- (Laughter.)

MR. POLANSKY: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So I'm looking at Documents No. 124, 126, and 128 on the docket. And I will just say that, because I think I kind of got it wrong and then Judge Sorokin corrected me on the docket, I did communicate with him about precisely what his idea is about the information that was downloaded by the expert. So I'm happy to address

that with you.

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So let's start with 124, and these are the documents relating to the Do Not Call requests. And I think I will hear you, whether you want to say, but, Mr. Polansky, when someone opts out of receiving a call, what is the screen that they're looking at? Because I just happen to know from my personal experience you are sometimes asked to give reasons for unsubscribing or opting out of future calls, and I don't know if that's the case here.

MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, based on the recent testimony of Drips, the vendor that provides the actual text messages, the person, the consumer, who receives the text can simply write "stop, lawyer, do not call." They can just text back in the string, in text that they receive, something along those lines.

And the attorney -- or I guess the 30(b)(6) representative for Drips testified they have a very liberal view as to an opt out. So "stop" is enough. If they mention a lawyer. If they say, "I don't want any call or texts," anything like that -- and I believe it's even more broadly, that person, that consumer, will text back to Drips, and they will be removed from the text going forward.

THE COURT: Okay. If someone mentions the word "lawyer," does that signify anything to you?

MR. POLANSKY: To me, no.

1 THE COURT: Does it not signify that they don't 2 think they should have been getting the texts? 3 MR. POLANSKY: It doesn't imply that at all to me. THE COURT: Why not? 4 MR. POLANSKY: Because you might just say, "I'm a 5 6 lawyer" just to stop receiving something. I mean, in times 7 where I get a phone call that I believe that I haven't received -- that I've never consented to, I may say, Listen. 8 9 I'm a lawyer. I ask you not to do it. 10 But it doesn't imply that they didn't actually consent 11 to something, or it isn't even evidence that they didn't 12 consent to something. I don't think by suggesting or 13 stating that you have a lawyer means that you didn't provide 14 consent or even evidences that. 15 MR. McCUE: Your Honor, could I be heard? 16 THE COURT: Sure. 17 MR. McCUE: This is absurd. It's absolutely 18 absurd. 19 When a consumer responds, they're responding via text. 20 They're saying, Stop calling. Do not call me. And we don't know what else they're saying. I never consented. 21 2.2 This is absurd. I --23 THE COURT: Let me just ask you, Mr. McCue, let's 24 say that you have 48,000 phone numbers of people you know 25 that opted out.

MR. McCUE: Right.

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THE COURT: So what are you going to do with 48,000 phone numbers?

MR. McCUE: So here is the crucial point, right.

The issue right now is we are proceeding individually as to Mr. Mantha. We haven't gotten to the class side yet. The issue is consent. Did they have consent? And did

QuoteWizard, were they on notice that their perceived consent that they got from third parties, some that are in Bosnia, was not legitimate? So if 47,000 people are responding saying, Stop calling me, that to anyone, anyone doing any level of due diligence, would mean, Holy cow, what's going on? We thought we had --

THE COURT: So this is 47,000 out of how many calls?

MR. McCUE: This is the problem, your Honor, is that they have fought tooth and nail from the beginning not to tell us that, okay. At the Drips deposition,

Mr. Polansky tried to obstruct -- to get testimony from Drips. Even Drips' own attorney said they're going to allow that testimony, and the best we got was that there are millions of these texts, millions.

THE COURT: So if there's millions sent out by Drips and you have 16,000 people who respond, "Do not call," then this doesn't seem that significant, right?

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MR. McCUE: Here's the crucial point, your Honor, here's the crucial point. They are supposed to have prior express written consent for every person they send a text to, millions and millions of people. The 47,000 people are just those people who are taking the time to affirmatively respond and say, What the heck, stop calling me.

We know from our experience, and you probably know as a consumer, the vast majority of time you get a telemarketing call, you don't take the time to respond and formally opt out. You just blow it off.

So the fact that there are 47,000 to us signifies a massive problem. You can't look at that and say, Well, that's a small problem. You have to look at the macros. Where is the evidence that they had consent to contact all these people? They don't have it.

The 47,000 opt outs is red-flag confirmation that they have problems in their consent, and they should be looking into it. And to withhold that evidence, despite your explicit order to produce the Do Not Call requests, not just the phone numbers, defies what you had told them to do.

We're entitled to look at those comments. If someone says, I have a lawyer, holy cow, that is a red flag that the call is illegal and QuoteWizard is on notice that they should be doing something to look into that problem.

They have not given us that --

THE COURT: Okay.

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So, Mr. McCue, if you get the comments that went along with the opt outs, does this satisfy you for the time being?

MR. McCUE: Your Honor, that's the first. At least we get that, right. But you notice what they did in response to complaints, right? You said they need to produce the complaints, and then as to complaints relating -- documents relating to the complaints, we were to meet and confer, right.

So what QuoteWizard did is they said, Well, oh, we have 47,000 opt outs, but we're just going to say that those are 47,000 Do Not Call "complaints," and we're going to say those are "opt outs." And because we've now magically redefined these 47,000 "do not calls" as "opt outs," we don't have to confirm that they had any complaints, and they don't have to meet and confer about documents relating to those complaints.

That is absurd, your Honor.

It is a complaint. When someone says, Stop calling me, that is a complaint.

So what we're looking for, and I laid it out in a prayer for relief, is very specific references to what we need, and QuoteWizard and their counsel have a way of parsing your words, redefining your words, shape-shifting around what the intent is. That's what they're doing.

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So very specifically we're looking for all the Do Not Call requests, the comments, the texts themselves. What are you consumers telling QuoteWizard? And then we want to know, internally at QuoteWizard, did they care? Did they care that 47,000 were saying, Stop calling me. Did that raise any red flags?

That goes two ways. One it could show, yes, they were concerned and they didn't do anything about it; or, no, they weren't concerned at all. Either way, that supports willfulness of Mr. Mantha's individual claim.

THE COURT: That's not all you asked for in your prayer for relief though. So if you get the substantive comments relating to the 46,000 Do Not Call requests, and I really feel like, All documents referring or relating to them is too broad. I think that just has to be tightened up.

But other than that, what else in this prayer for relief do you think is appropriate at this time?

I mean, I did feel like if you can show that your client or that -- I know the burden is on them, that they can't show that your client consented --

MR. McCUE: Right.

THE COURT: -- then isn't this kind of a detour at this stage of the case?

MR. McCUE: It is not, your Honor, and let me

explain why.

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We know that Mr. Mantha's call was illegal. The TCP provides for minimum damages are \$500 and \$1500 for willful or knowing violations. This whole issue, yes, does it goes to class issues, yes, but it also goes to the individual issue of the willfulness of his individual claim. Is he entitled to \$1500 in damages or just 500? 500 is a negligence violation. What we are talking about here is evidence that goes to willfulness.

THE COURT: Okay.

So, Mr. Polansky, what do you say to all this?

MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, I have quite a bit to say.

I mean, we've got to look at the proportionality of their request. So there are two calls at issue, or two text messages at issue. That's 500 per violation. And if it's willful, it's treble to 1500, for a total of 3,000, three thousand dollars. They would like to produce from a nonparty, because QuoteWizard's already said, We don't have the documents they seek, these actual substantive complaints. Or they want to call them "complaints." They are opt outs. We don't have --

THE COURT: Mr. Polansky, what evidence do you have that Mr. Mantha consented to get these calls?

MR. POLANSKY: We have been provided information

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from Plural Marketing that shows the date that he signed up, the information related to the type of auto insurance that he sought, the information he had, and the consent language that he provided. THE COURT: This is the Snappy Auto Insurance thing? MR. POLANSKY: It is. MR. McCUE: Your Honor, could I just be heard on that? MR. POLANSKY: May I be heard? THE COURT: Yes, let Mr. Polansky finish. Okay. MR. POLANSKY: What we heard ad nauseam is, This is absurd; this is absurd. It's not. It's a \$3,000 case, a \$3,000 case in which the plaintiffs have just conceded they want class discovery despite Judge Sorokin saying it's not open yet. I mean, they want 46,000 emails, or text messages, that Drips has, to comb through to make a class discovery or a class certification argument at this point. It's too early, I mean --THE COURT: Well, it does go to willfulness, though, right, if you have numerous consumers threatening legal recourse as they opt out? I mean, that suggests to me that they don't think they consented.

MR. POLANSKY: We have no evidence that they've threatened legal action when they opted out.

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THE COURT: What if someone says "lawyer"? What does that mean to you?

MR. POLANSKY: It doesn't mean they're threatening legal action. They say, "I have a lawyer."

I mean, you may become annoyed with some of these texts and say "I have a lawyer," and that's the only way, you know, some caller may stop calling. That doesn't mean you actually intend to file anything. It doesn't mean you served a demand letter.

THE COURT: But it means you don't believe you consented or you wouldn't say that.

MR. POLANSKY: I disagree. I disagree.

We sign up as consumers on emails or pages all the time when you go to purchase things which you don't know about. And you may have inadvertently unclicked the box that says, hey, I don't want to receive. And just after the fact because you get calls and emails, because it happens to me too, doesn't mean that I didn't consent. It means that at that point in time I may have forgotten that I opted in. I may have not seen that I opted in, and at that point in time I don't want any more calls.

But to receive 46,000, you know, documents that the plaintiffs want relating to class discovery at this time is

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inappropriate, and it's not proportional to the needs of the case.

I mean, Mr. Mantha didn't even opt out, so it's not even a question of whether he opted out. He never did, but --

MR. McCUE: Can I be heard quickly?

THE COURT: Wait. Let Mr. Polansky finish.

MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, when you read Request for Production 25 and 26 in conjunction, we complied with Request 25, which is, Identify the opt outs, the DNC requests. We've provided that.

No. 26, your Honor denied that request, which is, All documents related to the DNC request" without prejudice, and yet here they are seeking a motion for reconsideration, not having done so the first time around, and seeking the same --

THE COURT: "Without prejudice" means we will discuss it further to me, that if I deny something without prejudice, that means, let's see what you get on the Do Not Call requests -- I mean, frankly, I never dreamed there would be 48,000 of them, but I don't know that much about your client's business -- and then we'll see. I didn't want to order all the documents without knowing what we were dealing with.

MR. POLANSKY: Correct, your Honor.

But here's nother issue. Now, one of the words that
Drips testified to, and this wasn't in relation to
QuoteWizard, by the way, it was in relation to their clients
when they were talking about what an "opt out" to them is.
And that's what they said: This is an "opt out," not a
"complaint," an out opt. They said words like "lawyer." We
don't know if in any of theses there's the word "lawyer."
We're going to have to do significant discovery to see if
the word "lawyer" comes up in any of these as they relate to
QuoteWizard. That's just an example of the testimony
provided by Drips.

So at this point in time it could be a needle in a haystack. What if nobody says "lawyer"? Now we have to review \$46,000 [sic] on a \$3,000 claim.

MR. McCUE: Your Honor, if I could be heard briefly.

THE COURT: Okay.

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And, Mr. Polansky, I will let you speak again, but go ahead, Mr. McCue.

MR. McCUE: Mr. Polansky continues to reiterate how Mr. Mantha consented. We have taken multiple depositions, and the consent evidence is absolutely bonkers not true.

We've gone all the way back to the individual who runs Snappy Auto, and he says, I have nothing to do with Snappy Auto. It's been closed since 2015, and never had

Mr. Mantha's data in my system.

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So for him to continue to show up in court and say they have evidence of consent is just ridiculous.

What we're looking for on the Do Not Call -- you ordered them to produce the Do Not Call requests,

"requests," not the numbers. The numbers are part of the requests, but they need to produce the actual requests themselves.

And these are text messages, right, so just like Mr. Mantha, they've put before you every single text exchange they had with Mr. Mantha. They did that.

But now, when we're looking at, Show me the exact same evidence for people who demanded to stop calling, now they're claiming burden, right. These are text messages that Drips has in its possession. QuoteWizard has them in its possession or control. It got Mr. Mantha's text messages from Drips. Why can't it get the text messages of the 46,000 other consumers who said, "Do Not Call." And whether you call is an "opt out" or "complaint" or whatever language you want to label this, these are people telling QuoteWizard, Stop calling me.

It's directly relevant to willfulness, directly relevant to whether QuoteWizard should have been on notice that there were problems with their telemarketing.

What did they do about it?

So the next step, documents relating to that, I struggle to cabin requests because QuoteWizard has a propensity to redefine and reinterpret things so that relevant documents somehow don't have to be produced.

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So what we're looking for is documents internally at QuoteWizard where they're talking about this level, this high, high level, of complaints from people they're sending texts to. That's what we're looking for.

And the numbers, your Honor -- you asked, What else do we need? They redacted the numbers. I got an Excel spreadsheet that had a couple of columns on it -- I can send you the Excel if you'd like to look at it -- and the numbers are completely redacted for confidentiality reasons.

These are witnesses to our case, both to the individual case and to the class case. We should be able to look at those numbers, do a sampling from those numbers, contact those consumers and say, What was your experience? Did you really consent or not? That is all relevant.

And the standard here, your Honor, is "calculated to lead to admissible evidence." That is the standard.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

So let me ask you, Mr. McCue, do you accept

QuoteWizard's position that your client's cell phone number

may not qualify as residential to make a claim such as this

if you use it substantially -- if you used it substantially

for business or his employment?

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MR. McCUE: No, your Honor. That's their pivot, right.

So they started out -- they've threatened us with sanctions because of consent. Now we've completely beaten that back. Now they're going through my client's cell records and cherry picking what they think is a business phone call and arguing that this somehow magically takes the consumer's number off the registry.

That's not true. We'll litigate that issue before you.

That's not -- I guess it's before you on the second piece of this.

But the law on that is, Is the number on the DNC? That shows the consumer's objective -- objective feeling of, What is this phone number? Mr. Mantha doesn't have a landline. He doesn't have a traditional landline at home. He only has a cell phone. He uses that for personal reasons.

He's also a directer of group homes. He has to be on calls at all hours of the night. So, yes, he gets calls on his cell and he makes calls on his cell. That does not magically take that phone off the DNC. He pays for the phone bill. Yes, he gets a small credit for the payment, but it's -- he pays for it. The number's in his name. It comes to his home. He treats it as his personal cell phone. He put it on the Do No Call Registry.

So that's the next issue. So we'll litigate that before you, but that will be part of the summary judgment practice.

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But, no, we don't accept the fact that just because you made some business calls on your personal cell phone, that does not strip your phone of Do Not Call protection.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's what I'm going to do with regard to this issue about the Do Not Call list. I am going to require QuoteWizard to provide all the text messages either in Dribs or QuoteWizard's possession concerning the approximately 48,000 calls. And that just means what I say. All the text messages that are associated with those.

With regard to all the phone numbers, I am going to deny that without prejudice, and what I mean by that is once you get the text messages that correlate to those calls, and I expect them to be related to the list so that we can tell from the list which text messages go to which calls that are listed there on the discovery that has already been provided, then I may allow some sampling of that list where plaintiff is allowed to contact certain people. But I'm not going to order that 48,000 numbers be handed over to plaintiff to do with whatever they see fit.

So let's see what the text messages say, and we will do this step by step, and then I'll ask if the parties want to

1 confer on a certain sampling of the numbers being given 2 over, that's fine, and if you can't reach agreement on that, 3 then you can come back. Also with regard to the prayer for relief that's found 4 on Document 126 at page 5, I don't know the precise wording 5 6 of this request, but I am inclined to allow for QuoteWizard 7 documents discussing the Do Not Call requests. So let's see if you can work with that. That may need to be narrowed. 8 9 MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, may I inquire? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. POLANSKY: You would like documents related to 12 46,000 opt outs? 13 THE COURT: So what I am really looking for -- are you talking about the documents referring or relating to Do 14 15 Not Call requests? 16 MR. POLANSKY: No, I'm not referring to the text 17 messages relating to the 46,000. I'm referring to --18 THE COURT: So -- go ahead. 19 MR. POLANSKY: -- to whether there are internal 20 documents associated with every single one of those 46,000 21 documents, which is going to --

THE COURT: Here what's I'm interested in,

Mr. Polansky. If QuoteWizard officials or employees among
themselves are talking about the Do Not Call requests and
whether -- for example, let's say someone in QuoteWizard

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customer service says, Wow, this is a lot of Do Not Call requests. Are we sure all these people consented? Or someone says, Wow, you know, in 50 percent of the Do Not Call requests, people are threatening legal action. Does this have any significance for us? Things like that. there's discussion of the Do Not Call requests, or -- I mean, frankly, I'll just say I find it hard to believe that if you're making millions of calls at your business that there are no complaints, even unreasonable ones. I just find that kind of crazy. There must be some consumer complaint office at QuoteWizard, right? And they're just completely idle? They get no business at all? They're just sitting --MR. McCUE: Your Honor, may I be heard? THE COURT: -- there? You're never --McCUE: Your Honor, just very quickly on that? MR. THE COURT: -- getting one complaint at all? Yes, go ahead. MR. McCUE: Your Honor, this is another issue that you haven't addressed yet, and I really hope you will. QuoteWizard is allowed to call everything an "opt out," then there are no "complaints." That's the magic land that they're living in right now. So when you say "complaints," when I say "complaints," QuoteWizard says, Oh, oh, they're not "complaints," so, therefore, we have no responsive

documents.

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THE COURT: Here's the thing. I think you're both right. I think it's perfectly possible that someone who did consent didn't realize it and then opts out. I think it's possible that someone who did consent decided they didn't want to and opts out. And I think it's possible that there are people who never consented and get the texts and are furious and opt out.

So we're looking for the last group, right, people who never consented and opted out? And I am just -- I don't know how to get at that data.

But I will just say, Mr. Polansky, it's kind of fishy to me that there aren't ever any complaints.

MR. POLANSKY: When you say a "complaint," are you talking about filed litigation? We have produced all that.

THE COURT: No. I don't mean a complaint in a court of law. I mean a complaint to a company, like someone sends your company a missive somehow somewhere saying, How come you keep texting me, or, I didn't consent to this. Or there's no one single person who texts backs, "I never consented"?

MR. POLANSKY: Well, your Honor, I mean, we're going to get the 46,000, you know, opt outs, and then I guess that will tell us.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POLANSKY: I mean, I would request that that at least be modified. I mean, again, part of the issue here is that Mr. Mantha never opted out. Now, can we at least limit these opt outs until the time frame in which Mr. Mantha received the texts? I mean, anything after doesn't make any sense because the text has already been sent.

THE COURT: January 2018 to October 2020, is that the time period, Mr. McCue?

MR. McCUE: I believe that's the time frame of the scope of the Drips campaign, your Honor.

And it is essential, your Honor, that the details of what you're talking about are very clear because what QuoteWizard will do is they'll say, Oh, this text message doesn't say, "I did not consent." It might say, "Stop calling me," or, "Why are you texting me," but because it didn't have the magic language it doesn't have to be produced.

So I think the way to get around this and deal with this -- it doesn't matter what you call it, right. You can call it "complaints," you can call it "opt outs." So maybe for every single order now for QuoteWizard it has to say "complaints" or "opt outs." So "Documents to complaints or opt outs internally at QuoteWizard must be produced."

And it's not -- your Honor, you asked about trying to find the right bucket. You're right, that the bucket we're

looking for, people who consented didn't consent to receive these calls, but all of the texts are relevant. All of the responses are relevant. Some of those folks might not have a complaint admittedly, maybe. We think nobody consented to these texts, nobody, or didn't consent in a valid TCPA way, but all of this is relevant to allow us to put the puzzle together.

MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, again I would object, given that this is class discovery, which isn't open, but I understand your ruling.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right.

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So with regard to number -- I think we can move on to 128.

So let me just say at the outset of these issues that I do think that Judge Sorokin meant that the data that was extracted by Mr. Mantha's former expert is in his possession for discovery purposes, not just for his Internet search history but the whole of it, and that's what Judge Sorokin meant.

So I think -- and it's his -- this is his case, so he gets the last word. So I think Mr. Mantha needs to go through the data that was extracted by the former expert, which Judge Sorokin says is in his possession and control for the purposes of discovery, and respond to all discovery

1 requests with that in mind, so not just certain ones. 2 Okay? 3 MR. BRODERICK: Understood, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 4 5 All right. I think that clears up one of the issues 6 that you have here. 7 With regard to Mr. Mantha's cell phone and who had access to it. I mean, Interrogatory No. 6 is just way 8 9 overbroad: Provide a list of employees, independent 10 contractors, agents of the school who had access to your 11 cell phone number or called your cell phone number in 2019 12 or whom you called from your cell phone number, names, 13 position of employment, any number from which they may have 14 called or did -- from which they may have called your cell 15 phone. 16 So he's supposed to contact every person who ever 17 called him who's in any way affiliated with the school and 18 say, What are all the numbers from which you might have 19 called me? 20 MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, we --21 THE COURT: That's way overbroad. 2.2 MR. POLANSKY: We would limit it to co-employees or 23 individuals that report to Mr. Mantha as they call him. 24 mean, one of the arguments in this case is whether this is a business line. We have already, just based on 10 or 12 25

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individuals, identified 1400 calls, 1400. Not a few, like Mr. McCue wants to say, 1400, with these other individuals who all report to him. He has a hundred -- he has, I believe, 100 people that report to him, one hundred. It's not going to be 1400 calls --

THE COURT: Do you have those people's information, the hundred people who report to him?

MR. POLANSKY: I have at this point just the call records. So I have phone numbers. I don't know who they relate to other than the 10 to 12 individuals we now know from the on-call list. That's it.

So it would be easy for him to go through. I mean, we're going to spend forty -- spend a substantial amount of time going through 46,000 records in addition. The plaintiff should have to go through his calls, they're not that extensive, and identify who that number belongs to as his employer.

THE COURT: Mr. McCue?

MR. BRODERICK: Your Honor, I will address that.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Broderick.

MR. BRODERICK: They have the employee directory, which is, I think, how they've been matching, claiming that these are clearly business calls. So they know who some of these folks are. I don't think it's a reasonable thing to say, Go figure out what 1400 calls were about that happened

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a year ago. I do think it's overbroad, and I strongly agree that this is a -- you know, during the deposition they were going down the list, so we said, There are people with after-hours access that would have to call him, and we provided that on-call list with the numbers of those people, his direct reports. He doesn't have 100 direct reports. He has -- he manages five group homes, and he has a handful of administrators who report to him.

So I do think it's an amazing burden. And, you know, comparing it to the electronic production of text responses, which we've gotten in other cases from Drips, you know, they maintain all of that electronically and can say -- and they have to. Under the TCPA you have to maintain that.

This is a totally different situation that they are trying to ask him to identify the subject matter and caller for all of those numbers when they already have the employee directory as well as the cell phone numbers of the administrators.

THE COURT: So I don't think they're -- in

Interrogatory No. 36, anyway, they're not asking you to go
through your own phone records and check off every person.

I think they're asking you to provide them with a list of
any work-related numbers that might have called your
client's number.

Is that so, Mr. Polansky?

MR. POLANSKY: Yes. And this would include not just the -- the directory only has the school's numbers. We are looking also for these individuals' cell phone numbers. That's how they call Mr. Mantha, not just from their own office number, but from their cell phone. So we're looking for both numbers.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Broderick, I don't think it's unreasonable to ask for the cell phone numbers, not just the work numbers, of people who were calling him for work-related reasons.

MR. BRODERICK: That seems to me a very different request than how I read it --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BRODERICK: -- but that I do think we can do, your Honor, to say, look --

THE COURT: I just think what it boils down to,

Mr. Broderick, is your client should provide QuoteWizard

with the numbers, whether they're cell phone -- private cell

phone numbers or work desk numbers that are related to

people who call him from work on work-related issues. And

so, for example, if there's even like an outside social

worker or someone who doesn't work directly for the Perkins

School but is calling him on a work-related issue, he needs

to provide them with that number just so they can

cross-reference it. And obviously these numbers are going

to be protected and highly confidential so they won't be used for any other purpose than this.

MR. BRODERICK: Okay. Could I ask for a little clarification, your Honor, because they have the entire directory of the Perkins School -- or make a suggestion, I should say?

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. BRODERICK: If he were to provide -- he can't necessarily know who has his cell phone number. If somebody else gave -- you know, Coworker A gave Mr. Mantha's cell phone to Coworker B, but he didn't give it to him directly, but if he can provide a list of people whose cell phone he has, that seems to me would be a way to say, Okay, this is a coworker who I know I have his cell phone, so I think he has mine.

THE COURT: Well, that's great, and I think that's a start. But I also think if there are calls on his phone from people's cell phones rather than their work phones -- I mean, I happen to know in my job I hardly ever use my desk phone. I use my cell phone constantly, especially during COVID. You're just not sitting at your desk all that much.

MR. BRODERICK: Right.

THE COURT: So if he's getting cell phone calls from coworkers, those need -- I'm sorry, but those really just need to be provided. They're not in the directory. Is

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       the directory just mainly people's official phone lines kind
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       of thing?
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                MR. BRODERICK: Yes, that's right.
                THE COURT: Okay.
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            I guess this isn't -- is this covering the time of
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 6
       COVID? What's the time period here?
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            (Background phone ringing.)
                MR. BRODERICK: No, this predated it, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: So we know Mr. McCue is still getting
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       calls at his desk.
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            (Laughter.)
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                MR. BRODERICK: He's very old fashion, your Honor.
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                    McCUE: It is my business landline, which is
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       not on the Do Not Call list.
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                MR. BRODERICK: He's got an analogue dial on his
       desk, your Honor.
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17
            (Laughter.)
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                THE COURT: All right. So let's get to work on
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       that and see -- I mean, it may be there's someone who's --
20
       well, I don't know what to say.
            Let's see what you can do to provide QuoteWizard with a
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       list of work-related numbers, whether they're people's
23
       personal cell phones or not.
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                MR. BRODERICK: Work-related numbers, I mean --
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                THE COURT: I mean if people are calling him for
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work purposes from their cell phones, you need to get that to QuoteWizard.

MR. BRODERICK: Right.

"Who calls you using their cell phone, and do you know what that cell phone number is?"

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. BRODERICK: "Who is it that you work with, whether it's an outside social worker or what have you?"

We can do that.

MR. McCUE: Your Honor, if I could just flag for you the slippery slope here?

Some of these folks are calling Mr. Mantha for -- they're his friends.

THE COURT: So this is something you will have to cover. What's the content of calls from work phones that's actually personal and not business? But that's just -- I mean, that doesn't mean you don't give them the number.

MR. McCUE: I just want to flag for you, you -know, down the road we're going to go there. And the courts
that have looked at these issues have looked at objective
common evidence. Who's name is the phone in? Is it the
name of a business? Oh, it's a business phone. Is it in
the name of a consumer? Well, that's more likely a consumer
number. Who is the bill sent to? Is it sent to someone's
residence? Well, then it's probably a personal phone. Is

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the number on the DNC? There's a presumption if it's in the DNC, literally a presumption the FCC has said, that that's a personal line.

So I understand that he wants to go down this slippery slope, get all these numbers, but what I want to focus you on, your Honor, is at the end of the day this comes down to common proof. His number is not a business number. He doesn't declare it as a business expense. He doesn't -- I'm sorry. It's not a business expense. It's in his name. It doesn't go to his work.

THE COURT: So here's the thing. Work with Mr. Polansky on this, and if it turns out they're just getting too granular and you think we don't need to go down that road, then I think it is time to file a motion to stop the discovery in that area and raise these cases because I don't know what you're talking about, frankly. I mean, I just have never looked at this before. So I hear you, and maybe you win on this issue right now and there shouldn't be any discovery on it, but until I am presented with that in a more formal way, I am not going to rule that way because I don't know the case law you're talking about.

MR. McCUE: Sure.

MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, so does your current order stand with respect to the information, or the requested information, that you provided to Mr. Broderick?

THE COURT: Yes. I think he should provide you with the numbers of people who called for work-related matters, whether it's their work phone or their cell phone.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POLANSKY: Thank you.

So with regard to --

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MR. BRODERICK: Your Honor, could I just respond quickly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BRODERICK: I don't want my discovery response to be deemed as an admission that, Yes, you got a work call on your cell phone, as opposed to, This is somebody who I work with who called me on my cell phone.

The only thing that my ears perked up at was, If he called you for work. It might be impossible to say that, for, you know --

THE COURT: Sure.

So I think if you're going -- let's say there's a person at work who never called him for work-related purposes but was only his friend, and maybe they're not working with him directly, they're working somewhere else and they're just his buddy. I think you should still note that. Like, Here's an employee, but we happen to know that all their calls were personal calls. But they should know that just for clarity sake.

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numbers?

And if you have someone who's half-and-half, maybe you want to let them know. Our client would say about half the time this person's calling for personal reasons and that type of thing. And if it turns out, as Mr. McCue has suggested, that this is all a big waste of time and you just win hands down on these others issues such as, it's his phone, it's the only phone, it's sent to his house, et cetera, then you may want to brief that. Okay, so Interrogatory No. 37, "Identify the phone numbers used for the on-call system." It sounds like that's been done, right? MR. POLANSKY: No, that wasn't done. The on-call would be -- I think it would be inclusive, and I think Mr. Broderick can confirm if I'm incorrect. think it would be inclusive of your prior -- or your previous order just now. THE COURT: Okay. MR. POLANSKY: We're looking for the individuals who were working within the on-call system who called Mr. Mantha after hours when he isn't at work. THE COURT: So you're looking again for cell phone

MR. POLANSKY: That's right.

THE COURT: I think that is included in what we

just talked about.

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Mr. Broderick?

MR. BRODERICK: Yes, but also the document that was provided had the cell phone numbers of the night responsible folks who report to Mr. Mantha.

THE COURT: So maybe you don't --

MR. BRODERICK: But it will certainly be included in the supplemented provision of cell phone numbers. And it may be that they're after, What is the sort of -- what is the hotline cell phone number, which I believe is on that sheet, but that may be a separate number. So I'll just confirm that as well.

THE COURT: Okay.

So with regard to the monthly credit, so plaintiff's position is, I got \$30 a month, and defendant says, Well, show me proof of that.

Am I correctly characterizing the dispute?

MR. POLANSKY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So what's wrong with showing the \$30 that he gets in some kind of documentation?

MR. BRODERICK: We do have a document that does reference \$30, and I had thought, honestly, in our confer meeting that that was something that wasn't disputed. We would even stipulate to that. If he has to dig out every pay stub, it seemed a waste of time. There was no dispute,

both in his testimony and in the document that he provided, that shows there is a \$30 reimbursement.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Polansky.

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MR. POLANSKY: Yes, I think we'd be entitled to that documentation. It certainly goes to the credit. It goes to the issue of whether he uses his phone for business. I don't think we should have to rely on his testimony when documents do exist.

Moreover, it wouldn't just be the pay stub. It would also be if there's an application. But let's say -- and I don't know if this exists, but if it does, we would be entitled to it -- he files an application every year with his employer which says, you know, I use my phone for business purposes. If there's that sort of application that he has to fill out to get the credit, we should be entitled to that.

We haven't heard whether that exists or not.

MR. BRODERICK: That doesn't exist, and I conferred with Ms. Kingston on that. He doesn't have a document like that.

I'm just guessing whether an empty pay stub may have a \$30 line on it without having to dig out pay stubs for the entire time. I mean, we've already got testimony from his employer that that is the amount of the credit. They produced documents to that effect, but Mr. Mantha doesn't

have any documents in his possession like a yearly re-upping for the \$30 a month.

THE COURT: And \$30 just appears on his pay stub?

MR. BRODERICK: That's right.

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THE COURT: Okay, so, Mr. Polansky, do you really want a copy of his monthly pay stub?

MR. POLANSKY: Well, what about tax returns? Does he use this for business purposes? Is he writing any of it off? I mean, that's really what this goes to.

The reason this came up, your Honor, is we asked for this information early on, about whether this goes to a business purchase, and they respond and said, We don't have any documents.

Then we find out in the second deposition that, Hey, by the way, I get a credit for this, the use of this phone.

So we should be entitled to the documents and not just relying on his testimony in the event that it's different.

Maybe it's more than \$30. Maybe it's half of what he's receiving.

THE COURT: Okay.

So I think I'm going to ask you to give two pay stubs that show a \$30 credit in the relevant time period, and then if there are any -- if there's any reference to this on his tax returns, you need to show that. You don't have to give over the whole tax return, but any reference on the return

to this -- the use of this phone, they should have, 1 2 defendant should have. 3 And what are the years of the tax returns, Mr. Polansky? 4 5 MR. POLANSKY: It would just be 2019. 6 THE COURT: Okay, 2019 tax return, if there's any 7 write-off for the phone, you should get that to Mr. Polansky. 8 9 Okay. So with regard to the imaging of the plaintiff's 10 electronic devices, I'm not going to order that. I think 11 I've made it clear what Judge Sorokin intends with regard to 12 that, and so I think that's enough. 13 So, anything I have missed? 14 MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, can I just be heard on 15 that, just quickly, and I understand your ruling. 16 THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead. Sure. 17 MR. POLANSKY: So early in this case the plaintiffs 18 thought it important enough to retain an expert to take the 19 imaging, review it, and then provide an answer to an 20 interrogatory stating, Hey, he never consented. 21 Since that time they've gotten rid of the expert and 2.2 refused to provide the imaging. 23 Now, we have no idea what's on that imaging, other than 24 taking them at face value in their discovery responses

saying, There's no responsive documents.

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Now, it seems unlikely, and it's very surprising and interesting, that they would hide behind this spiel of an expert then not use him just so we can't get the imaging. I mean, there's obviously something in there that's responsive and relevant, otherwise they would produce it. And we've even agreed to a protective order. But I just find highly surprising and interesting that they can obtain an expert, obtain the imaging, have the expert opine as to the imagining, and now not produce anything. And so we'll never be able to produce whatever imaging existed and take them at face value when they originally said that, you know, these documents don't exist. They could have just said that in the beginning. They didn't need an expert. They could have said, These documents don't exist.

MR. McCUE: Your Honor, if you I could be heard briefly?

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. McCUE: We retained an expert after

Mr. Polansky sent me a Rule 11 saying he's is going to hold

me personally responsible for sanctions for filing a

frivolous lawsuit. So given the gravity of the allegation,

which is absolutely false, we took an extra step to make

sure data was preserved. If Mr. Mantha's computer had been

lost or blown up somehow, they would have been arguing

spoliation. So we wanted to make sure that we were crossing

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the Ts and making sure that there was no way that they could argue spoliation. That's the only reason why we retained him, and to make sure that these Rule 11 threats were absolutely nonsense.

So now we've proven that any allegation of consent is nonsense. Every deposition has led to a dead end for Mr. Polansky. That's the only reason we hired an expert. We don't do it in typical cases, but when someone comes out of the box with a Rule 11 sanctions letter, yeah, it gets my attention; and, yeah, I'll pay the extra money to make sure a forensic expert preserves the backup of the data so there's no spoliation nonsense and no sanctions nonsense down the road.

MR. POLANSKY: Your Honor, just quickly to respond?

So on that particular issue, I believe the letter was sent, and I don't have it in front of me, but I believe --

MR. McCUE: January of 2020, January.

MR. POLANSKY: Okay.

And according to Mr. Mantha, the data was extracted in April or June.

So it wasn't, We retained him right away to preserve the imagery. It wasn't until April or May that he was asked --

THE COURT: Let me just say, though, Mr. Polansky,

I think it's just beyond argument that -- a person's

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electronic devices these days has a ton of highly, highly personal information on it, especially -- I don't know what he keeps, but everyone keeps very highly personal information on their data. And I understand you're both very vigorously litigating this case, but I do just have to trust that Mr. McCue and Mr. Broderick are playing by the rules; and that if there's some evidence they're holding onto that their client consented, they're going to lose their bar cards if that's found out. So I'm not going to suspect that they've found some smoking gun that would blow their case up and they're sitting on it, and so --

MR. McCUE: Your Honor, the corollary is true. The corollary is also true, that when a defense counsel knows that their initial allegation of Rule 11, their initial threat against a plaintiff, a consumer plaintiff trying to step up and do the right thing for a class, when he knows that is nonsense, then he should formally withdraw the Rule 11 threat, and he should stop showing up in the front of the court and saying, We have consent, because he knows they don't.

THE COURT: Okay.

But at any rate, I will just say I have put plaintiff on notice that the extracted information is discoverable, and they're on their honor as officers of the court to go through it and produce to you not just the Internet search

1 history but any responsive information that's in there. 2 I'm going to trust them to do that. 3 MR. POLANSKY: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Yes. 4 Okay. So I would just say if at any time -- I know 5 6 emotions are running high here, but if at any time you want 7 to go to mediation, you can go. We'll refer you. We will give you whatever time you need to try to resolve the case. 8 9 We are doing mediations by Zoom, and you can pick your 10 magistrate judge, if you choose to use the court's mediation 11 program, anyone except for myself. And so I will just say 12 that and keep reminding you of that. 13 MR. POLANSKY: Thank you, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. BRODERICK: Thank you, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. I will try to memorialize 17 all this on the docket as I've been doing. If I get some of 18 it wrong or you want clarification, please just email 19 Ms. Belmont. I'm happy to clarify anything. And I 20 appreciate the parties filing the status reports. 21 very helpful, and I intend to try to stay on top of this 2.2 case and keep things moving for you. 23 Anything else I can do for you at this point? 24 MR. POLANSKY: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT:

Yes?

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MR. POLANSKY: As far as compliance with the forthcoming order, how much time are we looking at? I mean, there is quite a bit that we are going to have to produce. THE COURT: Sure. Why don't we try for two weeks. Do you think -- see what you can do, because my guess is if you have these lists of the numbers you may be able to pull up the list of the text messages fairly easily, so let's try for -- do you want to say three weeks? I notice --MR. POLANSKY: Three weeks. THE COURT: -- you're kind of raising your eyebrow. Okay, let's try for three weeks, and if that isn't possible and you have some good explanation for why it's not, you're welcome to work out a longer time period with plaintiffs without coming back to me. But if that doesn't work out, then I'll hear you on that. MR. POLANSKY: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Okay, so I'll get busy and try to get this right up on the docket, and we'll wait to hear from you if there's any refinements needed. MR. POLANSKY: Great. Thank you, your Honor. Thank you, Madam Clerk. MR. BRODERICK: Thank you, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 2 (Proceedings adjourned.) 3 4 5 CERTIFICATE 6 7 I, James P. Gibbons, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of 8 9 Massachusetts, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand notes 10 taken in the aforementioned matter to the best of my skill 11 12 and ability. 13 14 March 1, 2021 /s/James P. Gibbons James P. Gibbons 15 16 17 JAMES P. GIBBONS, CSR, RPR, RMR 18 Official Court Reporter 1 Courthouse Way, Suite 7205 19 Boston, Massachusetts 02210 jamesqibbonsrpr@gmail.com 20 21 2.2 23 24 25